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HEALTH CARE LAW
Sean P. Byrne *
Garrett Hooe **
INTRODUCTION
It has been several years since the Annual Survey of Virginia
Law published a comprehensive Health Care Law update.' In
that time, health care reform has taken center stage on the na-
tional level with the implementation of the Affordable Care Act
and related federal legislation. Here in the Commonwealth, we
have seen incremental change in the health care law landscape,
both in case decisions from the Supreme Court of Virginia impact-
ing medical malpractice jurisprudence, and in a host of reform
measures and legislative changes from the General Assembly. It
is beyond the scope of this article to detail every change in this
complex and fast-changing area of law, but noteworthy develop-
ments are highlighted here in an effort to inform the health law
practitioner.
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Over the last five years, the Supreme Court of Virginia has
weighed in on several important health care issues in the Com-
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1. See generally Kathleen M. McCauley & Kristri L. VanderLaan, Annual Survey of
Virginia Law: Health Care Law, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 473 (2009) (the most recent such
Health Care Law update).
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monwealth. The Virginia Medical Malpractice Act2 continues to
define the operation of medical negligence cases, and in Simpson
v. Roberts, the court addressed the issue of determining when fe-
tuses are "patients" under the Act.' Statute of limitations issues
also came before the court on a couple of occasions. In one partic-
ularly notable case, Chalifoux v. Radiology Associates of Rich-
mond, the court expanded the continuing treatment rule by find-
ing that even seemingly isolated instances of treatment may be
part of a continuous course that tolls the statute of limitations.
McKinney v. Virginia Surgical Associates addressed how the
statute of limitations affects personal injury and wrongful death
suits.' On an issue of importance to corporate health care law, the
court decided Lewis-Gale Medical Center, LLC v. Alldredge,
which addressed whether hospitals are at risk of tortious inter-
ference when they express dissatisfaction about employees pro-
vided by third party staffing agencies.'
Several cases provide guidance in the area of pleading and
practice. INOVA Health Care Services v. Kebaish explained a dis-
tinction in voluntary dismissal statutes between state and federal
courts that will be of importance in medical malpractice cases,
Weatherbee v. Virginia State Bar addressed ethical considerations
concerning the adequacy of pre-suit investigation,' and Landrum
v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hospitals, Inc. offered an in-
sightful articulation of the abuse of discretion standard of re-
view.' In the area of expert testimony, the court decided Hol-
lingsworth v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., which more
narrowly defined what types of health care providers could testify
* 10to causation in medical malpractice cases.
In Cashion v. Smith, the court addressed the qualified privilege
that normally protects conversations between health care provid-
ers and explained defamation in the context of those conversa-
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 to -581.20:1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
3. 287 Va. 34, 40, 752 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2014).
4. 281 Va. 690, 694, 701, 708 S.E.2d 834, 839-40 (2011).
5. 284 Va. 455, 460, 732 S.E.2d 27, 29 (2012).
6. 282 Va. 141, 153, 710 S.E.2d 716, 722 (2011).
7. 284 Va. 336, 339, 732 S.E.2d 703, 704 (2012).
8. 279 Va. 303, 309, 689 S.E.2d 753, 756 (2010).
9. 282 Va. 346, 352-53, 717 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2011) (quoting Kern v. TXO Prod.
Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984)).
10. 279 Va. 360, 366, 689 S.E.2d 651, 654 (2010).
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tions." Looking ahead at anticipated developments, just prior to
this publishing, the court in Temple v. Mary Washington Hospi-
tal, Inc. failed to reach the issue of the discoverability of hospital
policies and procedures as well as metadata associated with med-
ical records."
A. Medical Malpractice Act
1. Simpson v. Roberts
Simpson v. Roberts considered whether and when fetuses are
considered "patients," as that term is defined by the Virginia
Medical Malpractice Act (the "Act"). A "patient" is defined as
"any natural person who receives or should have received health
care from a licensed health care provider."" Whether an individu-
al is a patient is important because, among other reasons, only
treatment of patients is protected by the statutory damages cap.
In this case, Marissa Simpson brought a medical malpractice
suit regarding permanent injuries she sustained in utero, alleged-
ly because of a procedure performed on her mother before birth."
After developing gestational diabetes, Simpson's mother was re-
ferred to Dr. Roberts, who performed an amniocentesis to deter-
mine if Simpson's lungs were mature enough to induce early la-
bor." Dr. Roberts ceased his care following that procedure, and
Simpson was delivered later that day with damaged kidneys and
cerebral palsy." She alleged that these injuries were caused by
negligent performance of the amniocentesis." After a $7 million
jury verdict, the circuit court reduced her award to $1.4 million,
pursuant to Virginia's medical malpractice cap.20
11. 286 Va. 327, 337-39, 749 S.E.2d 526, 532-33 (2013).
12. No. 131754, 2014 Va. LEXIS 114, at *5, *9-10 (Sept. 12, 2014).
13. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 to -581.20:1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2013);
287 Va. 34, 40, 752 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2014).
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
15. See id. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
16. See Simpson, 287 Va. at 39, 752 S.E.2d at 802.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 38-39, 752 S.E.2d at 802.
20. Id. at 39, 752 S.E.2d at 802-03; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp.
2013).
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Simpson alleged that the Act's damages cap did not apply to
her because at the time of injury, she had not yet been born and
was therefore not yet a "patient" under the Act.21 The Supreme
Court of Virginia disagreed.22 The court instead solidified its prior
rulings in Kalafut v. Gruver2 3 and Bulala v. Boyd, which articu-
lated the so-called "conditional liability rule." This doctrine states
that "[a] tortfeasor who causes harm to an unborn child is subject
to liability to the child, or to the child's estate, for the harm to the
child, if the child is born alive."" Fetuses are considered to be a
part of their mothers until birth, but at the time they are born
alive (even if alive only momentarily), they obtain standing to
bring suit not only for injuries subsequent to birth, but for those
prior to delivery as well." Simpson attempted to distinguish her
case by arguing that Dr. Roberts never intended to treat her-
only her mother-and therefore she could not have been a pa-
tient.27 Again, the supreme court disagreed, turning to principles
of statutory interpretation to suggest that the Act intended to
broadly cover all physicians providing treatment with the "securi-
ty blanket" of the damages cap.28
The court's opinions in Bulala and Kalafut established that a
fetus may bring a claim if born alive, and Simpson removes any
doubt about the malpractice cap's applicability in those instances
where an injury occurs in utero. But being born alive also makes
the child a "patient" under the Act, which means that treating
health care providers are protected by the Act, including the stat-
utory damages cap, even though the child "patient" was not yet
born when the alleged negligent act occurred.29
21. Simpson, 287 Va. at 38, 752 S.E.2d at 802.
22. Id. at 44, 752 S.E.2d at 805.
23. 239 Va. 278, 283-84, 389 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1990).
24. 239 Va. 218, 229, 389 S.E.2d 670, 675-76 (1990).
25. Kalafut, 239 Va. at 283-84, 389 S.E.2d at 684 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 869(1) (1979) (emphasis added)).
26. See Simpson, 287 Va. at 43-44, 752 S.E.2d at 805.
27. Id. at 43, 752 S.E.2d at 805.
28. See id. at 41, 752 S.E.2d at 804.
29. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013) (creating a wrongful death
cause of action for the natural mother of a fetus that dies).
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B. Statute of Limitations
1. Chalifoux v. Radiology Associates of Richmond
Chalifoux v. Radiology Associates of Richmond is a noteworthy
case decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia because it seems
to mark an expansion of the continuing treatment exception to
the statute of limitations. That doctrine, an exception to the ordi-
nary application of the statute of limitations in medical negli-
gence cases, 0 delays the commencement of the two-year limita-
tions period where there is a "continuous and substantially
uninterrupted course of examination."' The application of the ex-
ception to specific factual circumstances has led to several note-
worthy case decisions over the years.3 2 Here, the court applied the
continuing treatment exception to a radiology defendant that did
not consider itself to have had a continuous and uninterrupted
course of treatment with the referenced patient."
Chalifoux received radiology scans conducted by Radiology As-
sociates of Richmond on six occasions over the course of approxi-
mately three years for intermittent head pain." Radiologists de-
tected no abnormalities until the final examination, when one
radiologist noted an anomaly that was, in retrospect, viewable on
previous scans." The last allegedly negligent examination oc-
curred on February 16, 2004, the final examination occurred on
October 22, 2005, and Chalifoux filed suit just shy of two years af-
ter the final examination, on October 12, 2007. Because the cir-
cuit court found that the examinations were "single, isolated acts"
30. See id. § 8.01-243(A) (Cum. Supp. 2014); Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 813, 146
S.E.2d 187, 189 (1966) (establishing that the statute of limitations begins to run when the
plaintiff is injured, not when the plaintiff discovers the injury).
31. Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969, 976, 252 S.E.2d 594, 599 (1979).
32. See, e.g., Justice v. Natvig, 238 Va. 178, 179-80, 182, 381 S.E.2d 8, 9-10 (1989)
(holding that eight years of non-negligent treatment following an allegedly negligent oper-
ation tolled the statute of limitations); Grubbs v. Rawls, 235 Va. 607, 609, 613, 369 S.E.2d
683, 684, 687 (1988) (finding that the statute of limitations commenced on the final day of
a continuous course of gastroenterological treatment); Farley, 219 Va. at 976, 252 S.E.2d
at 599 (holding that continuous dental treatment over the course of four years tolled the
statute of limitations).
33. Chalifoux v. Radiology Assocs. of Richmond, 281 Va. 690, 694, 708 S.E.2d 834, 836
(2011).
34. See id. at 700, 708 S.E.2d at 839-40.
35. Id. at 694, 708 S.E.2d at 836.
36. Id. at 693-94, 708 S.E.2d at 835-36.
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and suit was filed more than two years after the last allegedly
negligent examination, it dismissed Chalifoux's case as being
filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations."
The supreme court reversed and found that there was a con-
tinuous and uninterrupted course of treatment that tolled the
commencement of the statute of limitations until the treatment
course had concluded." The court reached its holding for three
primary reasons: (1) each radiology examination related to the
same or similar symptoms as previous studies; (2) there was evi-
dence that Radiology Associates was aware of Chalifoux's ongoing
symptoms because all the studies were kept in one file under
Chalifoux's name; and (3) radiologists frequently review previous
examinations, especially when they relate to the same symp-
toms." Chalifoux arguably expanded the common law under-
standing of what constitutes "continuous treatment" sufficient to
prolong the commencement of the applicable statute of limita-
tions.
2. McKinney v. Virginia Surgical Associates
McKinney v. Virginia Surgical Associates articulated the dis-
tinction between causes of action and rights of action in the con-
text of a nonsuit. In McKinney, the plaintiff decedent filed a med-
ical malpractice case, but died while the case was pending."o The
widow of the plaintiff decedent, as administrator of decedent's es-
tate, converted the pending personal injury action to one for
wrongful death." She claimed that the death was a result of the
defendant's negligence that was the subject of the case originally,
but then nonsuited the wrongful death case following discovery."
Within the nonsuit statute's six-month re-filing window,43 but af-
ter the lapse of the initial two-year limitations period, McKinney
filed a personal injury action based on the same alleged negli-
37. Id. at 695-96, 708 S.E.2d at 837.
38. Id. at 701, 708 S.E.2d at 840. But see id. at 701-02, 708 S.E.2d at 840-41 (Russell,
J., dissenting) (questioning whether the radiology examinations could legitimately be con-
sidered "treatment").
39. See id. at 700-01, 708 S.E.2d at 839-40.
40. McKinney v. Va. Surgical Assocs., 284 Va. 455, 458, 732 S.E.2d 27, 28 (2012).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
108 [Vol. 49:103
HEALTH CARE LAW
gence as her nonsuited wrongful death action.44 The defendant
challenged the timeliness of the filing.45
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the cause of action in
the case was the defendant's alleged medical malpractice, out of
which arose two rights of action: (1) the decedent's right to bring
a personal injury action, which survived to be carried on by his
personal representative after his death; and (2) the personal rep-
resentative's right to bring a wrongful death action.4 ' The plain-
tiffs nonsuit in the wrongful death case applied to the cause of
action as a whole, which, therefore, enabled her to re-file either of
her rights of action within the six-month window after nonsuit."
McKinney helps to clarify the distinction between cause of action
and right of action.
C. Corporate
1. Lewis-Gale Medical Center v. Alldredge
Lewis-Gale Medical Center v. Alldredge addressed the rights of
hospitals with regard to third party staffing agencies by clarifying
the test for tortious interference in at-will employment contracts.
Dr. Alldredge was an at-will employee of a physician staffing
company which had an at-will employment contract with Lewis-
Gale Medical Center to staff its Emergency Department. 48 Dr.
Alldredge was working at Lewis-Gale when relations soured be-
tween the two.49 Lewis-Gale expressed concern about Dr.
Alldredge to the physician staffing company, which subsequently
fired her to preserve its relationship with Lewis-Gale."o Dr.
Alldredge then brought suit against Lewis-Gale for tortiously in-
terfering in her employment contract with the staffing company.
In Virginia, proving tortious interference by a third party re-
quires: (1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship; (2)
44. McKinney, 284 Va. at 458, 732 S.E.2d at 28.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 460, 732 S.E.2d at 29.
47. See id. at 461, 732 S.E.2d at 30.
48. See 282 Va. 141, 145, 710 S.E.2d 716, 717 (2011).
49. See id. at 145-46, 710 S.E.2d at 717-18.
50. See id. at 146-47, 710 S.E.2d at 718-19.
51. Id. at 147, 710 S.E.2d at 719.
2014] 109
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third party knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional interfer-
ence inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relation-
ship; and (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship
was disrupted.52 But when a contract is terminable at will, a
plaintiff must additionally prove that the defendant employed
"improper methods" in its interference, which usually means ille-
gal or independently tortious activity.8
In Alldredge, the Supreme Court of Virginia explained that
even when a third party intentionally interferes in a contract for
its own interest, tort liability does not automatically result." The
plaintiff must prove that the third party's actions were illegal or
fell so far outside the bounds of normal business practice-
"rough-and-tumble" as it may sometimes be-as to be improper.
Lewis-Gale's efforts to remove what it viewed as a troublesome
employee were not "improper" and, therefore; did not tortiously
interfere with the contract that employee had with her staffing
company employer. 56 Alldredge reinforces the burden of proof for
tortious interference, and may lessen certain concerns for busi-
nesses contracting with outside staffing companies by protecting
more direct involvement in personnel decisions.
D. Pleading and Practice
1. INOVA Health Care Services v. Kebaish
INOVA Health Care Services v. Kebaish held that a voluntary
dismissal in federal court is not equivalent to a nonsuit in Virgin-
ia state court-a finding that could impact medical malpractice
cases or other complex health care lawsuits in Virginia, where the
nonsuit statute is often invoked at some point in the life of the
case." Virginia Code section 8.01-380 provides one chance for
52. Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 120, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1985) (citing Calbom v.
Knudtzon, 396 P.2d 148, 150-51 (Wash. 1964)).
53. Dunn, McCormack & MacPherson v. Connolly, 281 Va. 553, 559, 708 S.E.2d 867,
870 (2011).
54. Alldredge, 282 Va. at 153, 710 S.E.2d at 722.
55. Id.; see also Williams v. Dominion Tech. Partners, LLC, 265 Va. 280, 290, 576
S.E.2d 752, 758 (2003) ("[The law will not provide relief to every 'disgruntled player in the
rough-and-tumble world comprising the competitive marketplace."').
56. Alldredge, 282 Va. at 153, 710 S.E.2d at 722.
57. 284 Va. 336, 346, 732 S.E.2d 703, 708 (2012); see, e.g., McKinney v. Va. Surgical
Assocs., 284 Va. 455, 457-58, 732 S.E.2d 27, 28 (2012); Bowman v. Concepcion, 283 Va.
110 [Vol. 49:103
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plaintiffs to dismiss their case and have an opportunity to re-file
it within six months.5 8 Similarly, 59 Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allows plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss their case
one time without prejudice.'
Dr. Kebaish filed a lawsuit that was litigated in federal court
against INOVA following an employment dispute and termina-
tion.61 He voluntarily dismissed the federal suit pursuant to Rule
41 before re-filing it in state court and attempting to use a non-
suit at the state court trial in accordance with section 8.01-380.62
INOVA contended that Dr. Kebaish had already taken his non-
suit when he voluntarily dismissed his federal case.6 ' The su-
preme court disagreed.64
The court noted that although Virginia nonsuit and federal
voluntary dismissal rights are procedurally similar, the exercise
of each varies significantly, with the nonsuit right being much
more expansive." It also insisted that "the term 'nonsuit' identi-
fies a specific practice used in Virginia civil procedure" that is not
related to the federal right of voluntary dismissal." With the
statute of limitations extensions that are attendant to these pro-
visions, this application of law could result in situations where
multiple dismissals of different types serve to prolong litigation.
2. Weatherbee v. Virginia State Bar
The Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Weatherbee v. Vir-
ginia State Bar can be read as a caution regarding the perils of
insufficient pre-suit investigation and the requirements of Rule
552, 560, 722 S.E.2d 260, 264 (2012); Johnston Mem'l Hosp. v. Bazemore, 277 Va. 308,
310, 672 S.E.2d 858, 859 (2009); Hicks v. Mellis, 275 Va. 213, 216, 657 S.E.2d 142, 143
(2008).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380 (Cum. Supp. 2014); see also id. § 8.01-229(E)(3) (Repl.
Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2014).
59. Or not so similarly. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
61. The case was initially filed in state court, but immediately removed to federal
court. Kebaish, 284 Va. at 339-40, 732 S.E.2d at 704-05.
62. Id. at 341 & n.4, 732 S.E.2d at 705 & n.4.
63. Id. at 342, 732 S.E.2d at 706.
64. Id. at 346, 732 S.E.2d at 708.
65. See id. at 345, 732 S.E.2d at 707.
66. Id. at 346, 732 S.E.2d at 708 (quoting Welding, Inc. v. Bland Cnty. Serv. Auth.,
261 Va. 218, 223-24, 541 S.E.2d 909, 912 (2001)).
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3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Rule provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert
or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and
fact for doing so that is not frivolous . . . ."6 The court previously
defined "frivolous" in part as "having no basis in law or fact."68
When Mr. Weatherbee filed suit on behalf of his client and al-
leged that Dr. Vaughan committed medical malpractice, he did so
without contacting Dr. Vaughan to ask whether the plaintiff had
been his patient or requesting medical records." As it turned out,
Dr. Vaughan never saw the plaintiff as a patient, and had no
privileges at the hospital at the time the plaintiff was treated.o
While Weatherbee claimed to have deduced that Dr. Vaughan
was involved based on some preliminary Board of Medicine web-
site research, he made demonstrably false claims on the face of
his complaint.71
The requirement of adequate pre-suit investigation to avoid
frivolous filing is not new, but this case sheds fresh light on what
exactly that requirement entails in the medical negligence con-
text to avoid ethical violations.
3. Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hospitals, Inc.
The circuit court in Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-
Willis Hospitals, Inc. properly excluded the plaintiffs expert wit-
nesses when pro hac vice out-of-state counsel failed to comply
with the applicable pretrial order. After defendants, through in-
terrogatories, requested identification of the plaintiffs experts,
out-of-state counsel submitted an expert designation containing
only the names of the experts without "the substance of the facts
and opinions . . . and a summary of the grounds for each opinion"
as required by Rule 4:1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia. When given an opportunity to correct the error, counsel
then submitted a supplemental designation that failed to include
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2014).
68. Byrd v. Byrd, 232 Va. 115, 120, 348 S.E.2d 262, 265 (1986).
69. See Weatherbee v. Va. State Bar, 279 Va. 303, 307, 689 S.E.2d 753, 755 (2010).
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1 (2014); see Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps.,
Inc., 282 Va. 346, 349-50, 717 S.E.2d 134, 135 (2011).
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the signature of local counsel, as required by Rule 1A:4(2)." The
circuit court then excluded the expert witnesses and entered
summary judgment for defendants.7 4
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the circuit court's de-
cision to sanction the plaintiff by excluding her experts was not
an abuse of discretion." It also found that the plaintiffs failure to
obtain local counsel's signature could not be amended because the
lack of signature made the original supplemental designation an
invalid instrument." The court also stated that prejudice to the
opposing party is not a consideration in the Rule's enforcement.7
Landrum is not only a reminder of the importance of observing
local rules when serving as pro hac vice counsel, but a warning to
even Virginia lawyers that state courts are willing to enforce pre-
trial orders and that errors may not always be amendable. This
message applies to all practice areas, but perhaps especially to
the health law context where-as in Landrum-dismissal of a
critical expert may result in summary judgment.
Landrum is noteworthy for another reason extending beyond
the medical malpractice context. In arriving at its decision, the
supreme court defined the abuse of discretion standard, often
used during appellate review of a circuit court's decision.7 ' The
supreme court embraced the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit's explanation for what constitutes an abuse of
discretion:
An abuse of discretion ... can occur in three principal ways: when a
relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not
considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered and
given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and no im-
proper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those factors,
commits a clear error of judgment.79
73. Landrum, 282 Va. at 350-51, 717 S.E.2d at 136; see R. 1A:4(2).
74. Landrum, 282 Va. at 351-52, 717 S.E.2d at 136.
75. Id. at 352, 355-56, 717 S.E.2d at 136-39.
76. Id. at 355, 717 S.E.2d at 138; see also Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Harman Mining
Corp., 264 Va. 279, 283, 568 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2002) (holding that legally invalid docu-
ments cannot be amended to gain compliance with the rules because "an amendment pre-
supposes a valid instrument as its object").
77. Landrum, 282 Va. at 355, 717 S.E.2d at 138.
78. Id. at 352-53, 717 S.E.2d at 137 (quoting Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968,
970 (8th Cir. 1984)).
79. Id.
2014] 113
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The court has heartily adopted this rule as the standard bearer
when reviewing cases for an abuse of discretion. In just under
three years since the Landrum opinion, the above principle has
been cited numerous times."o
E. Expert Testimony
1. Hollingsworth v. Norfolk Southern Railway
In Hollingsworth v. Norfolk Southern Railway, the Supreme
Court of Virginia declined to make an exception for podiatrists to
the general rule that only medical doctors may testify to the
cause of a human physical injury." This general rule stemmed
from the Virginia Code's edict that only medical doctors were
qualified to diagnose, and the supreme court's finding in Combs v.
Norfolk & Western Railway that the ability to diagnose is a re-
quired element of determining the causation of human injury."
The court has made exceptions in rare instances where non-
physical injuries were at issue. For example, licensed clinical so-
cial workers, though not medical doctors, may testify to the cause
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
Hollingsworth is significant for denying this kind of an excep-
tion to podiatrists. Hollingsworth sued his employer for foot inju-
ries allegedly sustained during the course of his employment.84 He
designated two podiatrists to testify not only to the treatment
that followed the injury, but to what caused the injury as well.
In finding that the podiatrists were not qualified to testify as to
causation, the supreme court returned to the emphasis on the
ability to diagnose discussed in Combs." The scope of practice of
podiatry under the Virginia Code-unlike that of the practice of
medicine-included only the ability to treat, not diagnose, and be-
80. See, e.g., Dang v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 132, 146-47, 752 S.E.2d 885, 893
(2014); Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass'n v. Batt, 284 Va. 409, 426, 732 S.E.2d 690,
700-01 (2012).
81. 279 Va. 360, 368, 689 S.E.2d 651, 655 (2010).
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2900 (Repl. Vol. 2009); Combs v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 256
Va. 490, 496-97, 507 S.E.2d 355, 358-59 (1998).
83. Conley v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 554, 563, 643 S.E.2d 131, 136 (2007).
84. Hollingsworth, 279 Va. at 363, 689 S.E.2d at 652.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 366. 689 S.E.2d at 654.
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cause the injuries at issue were physical, the other limited excep-
tions did not apply."
The general landscape remained unchanged after Hol-
lingsworth," but the case makes a meaningful distinction be-
tween physical and non-physical human injuries. This distinction
explains with greater clarity why only medical doctors are per-
mitted to testify to causation in most cases. By drawing this dis-
tinction, the case also considerably limits the possibility of fur-
ther exceptions to the general rule.8 9
F. Defamation and Qualified Privilege
1. Cashion v. Smith
Comments by health care providers about the competence of a
colleague may support a claim for defamation, depending on what
is said. Cashion v. Smith delved into the nuances courts consider
in making this determination. Immediately following a surgery in
which the patient died, the surgeon, Dr. Smith, accused the anes-
thesiologist, Dr. Cashion, of not making a sufficient effort to save
the patient and even accused him of intentionally withholding
lifesaving efforts.o Dr. Smith additionally accused Dr. Cashion of
"euthaniz [ing] [his] patient."
The Supreme Court of Virginia parsed the language Dr. Smith
used to determine which statements were potentially defamatory
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2900 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
88. Ultimately, the General Assembly added the term "diagnosis" to the definition of
"practice of podiatry," but left the holding of Hollingsworth intact by simultaneously
amending another section of the Virginia Code. See Act of Apr. 13, 2010, ch. 725, 2010 Va.
Acts 1312, 1312-13 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.2:1 (Supp. 2014); codified as
amended at id. § 54.1-2900 (Supp. 2014)) (redefining podiatrists as practicing medicine,
yet prohibiting them from testifying as experts against a doctor of medicine in a medical
malpractice case).
89. But see Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 391, 2014 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended
at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.2 (Cum. Supp. 2014)) (creating a legislative exception allow-
ing chiropractor or physician assistants to provide expert testimony in personal injury
cases regarding etiology, diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, treatment plan, and disability).
90. See Cashion v. Smith, 286 Va. 327, 332, 749 S.E.2d 526, 528-29 (2013) (listing the
statements made, which included: "He could have made it with better resuscitation." 'This
was a very poor effort." "You didn't really try." "You gave up on him." "You determined
from the beginning that he wasn't going to make it and purposefully didn't resuscitate
him.").
91. Id. at 332, 749 S.E.2d at 529.
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statements capable of being proven true or false, and which were
non-defamatory statements that were mere opinion." It found
that statements like "[t]his was a very poor effort" and "[y]ou
didn't really try" were subjective and viewpoint-dependent,
whereas statements like "[the patient] could have made it with
better resuscitation" and "[y]ou determined from the beginning
that he wasn't going to make it and purposefully didn't resusci-
tate him" were capable of being proven true or false, and thus
possibly defamatory." Although "rhetorical hyperbole" is not de-
famatory under Virginia law, the court found that in the context
in which it was said, the "euthanasia" statement could be under-
stood as an actual, demonstrably true or false allegation."
Statements between health care providers concerning patient
care are generally entitled to a qualified privilege because they
are "communications between persons on a subject in which the
persons have an interest or duty," but that privilege can be lost if
statements are made with malice." Malice, however, is a question
of fact for the jury, and may be established based on any one of
five factors articulated in previous cases." When conversations
get heated among health care providers, they should be wary of
the possibility that they are subjecting themselves to defamation
liability and potentially losing their qualified privilege. Cashion
articulates the analysis that applies to different types of state-
ments.
92. See id. at 336-37, 749 S.E.2d at 531-32.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 339-40, 749 S.E.2d at 533 (finding that statements characterized as rhetori-
cal hyperbole are those from which "no reasonable inference could be drawn that the indi-
vidual identified in the statements, as a matter of fact, engaged in the conduct described.")
(citing Yeagle v. Collegiate Times, 255 Va. 293, 295-96, 497 S.E.2d 136, 137 (1998)).
95. See id. at 337-38, 749 S.E.2d at 532 (elaborating that the qualified privilege "may
be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defamatory statement was made maliciously")
(quoting Larimore v. Blaylock, 259 Va. 568, 572, 528 S.E.2d 119, 121 (2000)).
96. Id. at 338-39, 749 S.E.2d at 532-33 (citing Raytheon Technical Servs. Co. v. Hy-
land, 273 Va. 292, 301, 641 S.E.2d 84, 89-90 (2007)); Larimore, 259 Va. at 575, 528 S.E.2d
at 122; Preston v. Land, 220 Va. 118, 120-21, 255 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1979); Story v. Norfolk-
Portsmouth Newspapers, Inc., 202 Va. 588, 591, 118 S.E.2d 668, 670 (1961); Chalkley v.




1. Temple v. Mary Washington Hospital, Inc.
Just prior to this publication, the Supreme Court of Virginia
decided this case. Due to the resolution of a threshold procedural
issue, the court did not reach a substantive question of wide in-
terest: whether hospital policies and procedures and medical rec-
ord metadata are discoverable after the General Assembly's 2011
amendments to Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17." In a previous
lawsuit on the same cause of action, the circuit court denied Ms.
Temple's motion to compel production of both hospital policies
and medical record metadata, after which she nonsuited and then
re-filed her case."
Hospital policies and procedures have long been the subject of
discovery disputes in medical malpractice litigation, with some
circuit courts finding them to be discoverable and others holding
them to be privileged or otherwise beyond the scope of permissi-
ble discovery." In 2006, the supreme court's decision in Riverside
Hospital Inc. v. Johnson hinted that a hospital's policies and pro-
cedures might, under certain circumstances, be offered to estab-
lish the standard of care.'o
In 2011, the General Assembly passed amendments that pro-
tect the "findings, conclusions, [and] recommendations . .. of any
medical staff committee.""0 ' This provision does not, however,
shield from discovery any "factual information regarding specific
97. The court held that a discovery ruling in a nonsuited case that is not expressly
incorporated in a subsequently filed case cannot be appealed in the new case, and there-
fore did not reach the merits. Temple v. Mary Washington Hosp., Inc., No. 131754, 2014
Va. LEXIS 114, at *9-10 (Sept. 12, 2014).
98. Id at *2-4.
99. Compare Day v. Med. Facilities of Am., Inc., 59 Va. Cir. 378, 378-80 (2002) (City of
Salem) (sustaining the motion to compel production of policies and procedures on the
grounds that the statute was not all-inclusive and the requested items were not subject to
privilege), and Bradburn v. Rockingham Mem'l Hosp., 45 Va. Cir. 356, 363 (1998) (Rock-
ingham County) (holding that the hospital's policies, procedures, and practice manuals
were discoverable), with Mangano v. Kavanaugh, 30 Va. Cir. 66, 68 (1993) (Loudoun
County) (finding that "all communications originating from or provided to such medical
committees" are protected from discovery), and Leslie v. Alexander, 14 Va. Cir. 127, 127
(1988) (City of Alexandria) (sustaining the objection to Plaintiff's Request for Production of
the hospital's policies and procedures on privilege grounds).
100. See 272 Va. 518, 529-30, 636 S.E.2d 416, 422 (2006).
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(C) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
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patient health care or treatment."'02 The court in Temple did not
yet have to decide whether the policies and procedures at issue
there were merely part of the facts of the case or privileged rec-
ommendations of a hospital committee focused on quality assur-
ance. It therefore falls to a future supreme court to decide this is-
sue and consider whether the discoverability of medical records
includes electronic metadata, such as user access records. 0 3
II. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
The past three General Assembly sessions were quite active,
with 2876 pieces of legislation introduced in the 2012 session,'
2575 in the 2013 session,o' and 2888 in the 2014 session.' If each
bill were just four pages long, the combined 8339 proposed laws
could be connected end-to-end to make a banner that would touch
the ground if hung from an airplane at 30,000 feet.' 7 Most recent-
ly, the 2014 General Assembly session concluded without a budg-
et, which commentators projected to approach (or exceed) $96 bil-
lion for the next two years.o' Governor McAuliffe subsequently
called for a special session to pass a budget, although as of early
May, the General Assembly had not reached an agreement.' The
central impediment to passing a budget concerns Medicaid ex-
102. Id. § 8.01-581.17(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
103. See also H.B. 490, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2014) (attempting to legislate
the discoverability of metadata).
104. 2012 Session, Session Statistics, VA.'S LEGIS. INFO. SYs., http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-
bin/legp604.exe?121+oth+STA (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
105. 2013 Session, Session Statistics, VA.'S LEGIS. INFO. SYs., http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-
bin/legp604.exe?131+oth+STA (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
106. 2014 Session, Session Statistics, VA.'S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-
bin/legp604.exe?141+oth+STA (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
107. For the mathematically inclined, 8339 proposed laws times four pages times elev-
en inches equals 365,916 inches, divided by twelve inches equals 30,576.33 feet. If the bills
were printed on legal-sized paper instead of letter-sized, the calculation comes to
38,915.33 feet instead.
108. Ginger Whitaker, General Assembly Adjourns Without Va. Budget, WAVY.COM
(Mar. 10, 2014, 5:45 AM), http://wavy.com/2014/03/10/general-assembly-adjourns-without-
va-budget/. Relatedly, The Richmond Times-Dispatch reported that the state's budget
shortfall could exceed $1 billion between 2014 and 2016. Michael Martz, State's Budget
Shortfall Could Exceed $1 Billion, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (May 28, 2014), http://www.
timesdispatch.com/news/local/government-politics/state-s-budget-shortfall-could-exceed-bil
lion/article 53fb7ee6-e6cO-11e3-9fb-0017a43b2370.html.
109. Whitaker, supra note 108; Nick Dutton & Joe St. George, Will McAuliffe Bypass




pansion."' On May 1, 2014, The Washington Post reported that
Governor McAuliffe was considering expanding health care cov-
erage for the poor without the General Assembly's approval."'
Whether this strategy affects passage of the state budget is a
question separate from whether the state government remains
fractured and contentious among party lines. Like it has been be-
fore, health care remains a focus in the Commonwealth."' Sum-
maries of those enactments from 2012, 2013, and 2014, are likely
to be of particular interest to health law practitioners and are in-
cluded below.
A. 2012 Session
1. Mammograms and Breast Density
In 2012, the General Assembly required the Board of Health to
establish guidelines requiring licensed facilities providing mam-
mography services to include information on breast density in
mammogram letters sent to patients."' Additionally, in letters
sent to patients having dense breast tissue, facilities and doctors
must include a notice containing information about potential ef-
fects of dense breast tissue on mammograms."' Virginia became
the third state in the country to enact such a law."' According to
the Virginia Hospital Center, dense breasts "do not necessarily
place a woman in a high-risk category" for cancer, and the law's
stipulation regarding information sharing appears designed to
110. Dutton & St. George, supra note 109.
111. Laura Vozzella, McAuliffe Explores Whether He Can Expand Medicaid Coverage
Without Legislature's Okay, WASH. POST (May 1, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/virginia-politics/mcauliffe-explores-whether-he-can-expand-medicaid-coverage-with
out-legislatures-okay/2014/05/01/8ff591f2-d090-11e3-b812-Oc92213941f4_story.html.
112. See Sean P. Byrne & Paul Walkinshaw, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Health
Care Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 441, 472-73 (2007) (articulating the importance of health
care law during the 2007 General Assembly Session).
113. Act of Feb. 28, 2012, ch. 6, 2012 Va. Acts 15, 15 (currently codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-229 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-229 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
115. Next Steps After "Dense Breast" Notification, VA. HosP. CTR., http://www.virginia
hospitalcenter.com/Portal/NexLSteps AfterDenseBreastNotifica.aspx?flush=true (last
visited Oct. 10, 2014).
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ensure identified patients are provided with notification and di-
rection for follow-up consultation."'
2. Home Care Organizations
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b imposes criminal penalties for acts
involving federal health care programs, including penalties for
false representation of material facts on benefit or payment appli-
cations, and illegal kickbacks."' The General Assembly amended
Virginia Code section 32.1-162.9 to preclude individuals who have
been sanctioned under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b from obtaining a li-
cense to establish or operate a home care organization in the
Commonwealth."' Only a little over a year after the law was
passed, three Virginia home care providers were indicted for their
efforts in fraudulently obtaining $1.3 million of Medicaid pay-
ments in 2013.19 Presumably, this law will prevent these individ-
uals from obtaining a future license to operate a home care facili-
ty.
3. Who May Perform Surgery
The 2012 General Assembly added Virginia Code section 54.1-
2400.01:1, which is among the longest statutes in the Virginia
Code in terms of numerals, to define "surgery" to mean the
"structural alteration of the human body by the incision or cut-
ting into of tissue for the purpose of diagnostic or therapeutic
treatment of conditions or disease processes by any instrument
causing localized alteration or transposition of live human tis-
sue... ."120 The statute further states that surgery does not in-
clude removal of superficial foreign bodies from the human body,
116. Id. The most recent version of the statute clarifies that "DENSE BREAST
TISSUE IS VERY COMMON AND IS NOT ABNORMAL... . THIS INFORMATION IS
GIVEN TO YOU TO RAISE YOUR AWARENESS." VA. CODE ANN § 32.1-229 (Cum. Supp.
2014).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012).
118. Act of Mar. 7, 2012, ch. 139, 2012 Va. Acts 201, 201 (currently codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.9) (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
119. Alyssa Gerace, Virginia Home Care Owners Indicted for $1.3 Million Fraud,
HOME HEALTH CARE NEWS (Nov. 7, 2013), http://homehealthcarenews.com/2013/11/virgin
ia-home-care-owners-indicted-for-1-3-million-fraud/.
120. Act of Feb. 28, 2012, ch. 15, 2012 Va. Acts 22, 22 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
54.1-2400.01:1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2013)).
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punctures, injections, dry needling, acupuncture, or removal of
dead tissue."12 1
The statute specifies who may perform surgery and requires
that a person meet one of the following six criteria before they
can structurally alter a patient:
(i) [be] licensed by the Board of Medicine as a doctor of medicine, os-
teopathy, or podiatry; (ii) [be] licensed by the Board of Dentistry as a
doctor of dentistry; (iii) [be] jointly licensed by the. Boards of Medi-
cine and Nursing as a nurse practitioner; (iv) [be] a physician assis-
tant acting under the supervision of a doctor of medicine, osteopathy,
or podiatry; (v) [be] a licensed midwife in the performance of episiot-
omies during childbirth; or (vi) [be] acting pursuant to the orders
and under the appropriate supervision of a licensed doctor of medi-
cine, osteopathy, podiatry, or dentistry.122
4. Nurse Practitioners as Part of a Health Care Team
There are many settings where nurse practitioners appear to
provide care independent of in-person supervision; for example,
home health care nurses often implement orders from physicians
located at hospitals while treating a patient at his or her home.
The General Assembly's 2012 amendments to Virginia Code sec-
tion 54.1-2957(B) appear to end doubts regarding whether a
nurse may operate autonomously from a physician by requiring
that nurse practitioners practice as part of a patient care team.'
A patient care team is "a multidisciplinary team of health care
providers actively functioning as a unit with the management
and leadership of one or more patient care team physicians for
the purpose of providing and delivering health care to a patient or
group of patients."124 Nurse practitioners must also collaborate
and consult with a patient care team physician.12 5 Collaboration
must be shown through either a written or electronic practice
agreement."'
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2400.01:1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
122. Id. § 54.1-2400.01:1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
123. Act of Mar. 10, 2012, ch. 213, 2012 Va. Acts 345, 350 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2957(B) (Repl. Vol. 2013)).
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2900 (Supp. 2014).
125. Id. § 54.1-2957(B) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
126. Id.
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Fittingly, this legislation was the result of two years of team-
work between the Medical Society of Virginia and the Virginia
Council of Nurse Practitioners.m' The effect of the law reaches be-
yond the Commonwealth, too, as American Medical Association
("AMA") President Peter W. Carmel, M.D., noted in April 2012:
"The AMA encourages other states to consider following Virgin-
ia's innovative approach as a way to ensure that patients have
the best possible access to quality health care.""' Others in the
industry believe the law allows for greater flexibility and use of
resources between physicians and nurse practitioners.2 '
5. Certificate of Public Need, Nursing Home Beds
The General Assembly charged several Virginia entities with
reviewing procedures related to applications for relocation of
nursing home beds under a 2012 law.3 o
6. Community-Based Care Providers
Providers of community-based continuing care ("CBCC") must
now be registered with the State Corporation Commission (the
"SCC") as a continuing care provider and also file a statement re-
garding the provider's CBCC status."' CBCCs are programs
providing or committing to provide a range of services to a person,
other than someone related by blood or marriage, under an
agreement effective for more than a year.'32 This includes services
provided in an individual's home.' CBCCs often provide services
to individuals aged sixty and older.'34 Registration with the SCC
127. Carolyne Krupa, Virginia Law Promotes Team-Based Care By Doctors and Nurse




130. Act of Mar. 21, 2012, ch. 301, 2012 Va. Acts 512, 512-13 (currently codified at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-102.3:5 to -102.3:6 (Cum. Supp. 2014)) (repealing licensure require-
ments but changing the entities to review procedures).
131. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-4918 to -4919(A) (Repl. Vol. 2014).
132. Id. § 38.2-4918 (Repl. Vol. 2014).
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., About Us, CHOOSEHOME, http://www.riversideonline.com/choosehome/ab
out-us.cfm (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
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permits the Commonwealth to more clearly delineate those or-
ganizations which provide CBCC care, and those that do not.
7. State Board of Health Guidelines for Cleanup of Drug Labs
"Meth Lab Explodes in Museum District," proclaimed the NBC
News 12 headline on November 20, 2011, reporting a story seem-
ingly straight out of the Breaking Bad television series."' Fifty-
one-year-old Jeff Prillaman resided in a Grove Avenue apartment
in Richmond, and was badly burned as a result of an explosion
and fire caused by his attempts to produce methamphetamine.16
Prillaman entered a plea deal and received two and a half years
in jail.m' During its 2012 session, the General Assembly added
section 32.1-11.7 to the Virginia Code to require the State Board
of Health to establish guidelines for the cleanup "of residential
property formerly used as a clandestine methamphetamine la-
boratory.""' These guidelines outline health concerns related to
the manufacture of methamphetamine, detail its contaminants,
and describe procedures for cleanup and disposal of harmful
chemicals created by the manufacturing process."'
8. Hospital Discharge Procedures
The provision of health care services to patients does not neces-
sarily begin and end while at a health care facility. While physi-
cians and care providers regularly made efforts to ensure that pa-
tients had proper information about signs and symptoms of
future illness, for example, the Virginia legislature had never cod-
ified such a requirement until 2012. The 2012 General Assembly
135. Meth Lab Explodes in Museum District, WWBT NBC12 (Nov. 20, 2011, 5:23 PM),
www.nbcl2.com/story/16086885/meth-lab-explodes-in-museum-district.com. Breaking Bad
follows the protagonist's "transformation from mild family man to a kingpin of the drug
trade." Breaking Bad-About, AMC, http://www.amctv.com/shows/breaking-badlabout
(last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
136. See Meth Lab Explodes in Museum District, supra note 135.
137. Phil Newsome, Man Suspected of Running Meth Lab in Richmond Goes to Court,
WWBT NBC12 (Jan. 11, 2013, 7:24 AM), http://www.wlox.com/story/20561685/man-sus
pected-of-running-meth-lab-in-richmond-goes-to-court.com.
138. Act of Apr. 18, 2012, ch. 778, 2012 Va. Acts 1668, 1668 (currently codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-11.7 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
139. vA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, GUIDELINES FOR CLEANUP OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY USED
TO MANUFACTURE METHAMPHETAMINE (2013), available at http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/
methguidelines/documents/pdf/VDH%20Guidelines%20for%2OMeth%20Cleanup.pdf.
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added section 32.1-137.02 to the Virginia Code, under which hos-
pitals in the Commonwealth must "inform and educate the pa-
tient, and his family when it is involved in decision making or on-
going care, about his follow-up care, treatment, and services."140
B. 2013 Session
1. Criminal History Information
The State Board of Health requires that a prospective volun-
teer or employee of an emergency medical services agency provide
fingerprints and certain personal information so that the individ-
ual's materials can be run against a state and national criminal
history record check. 14' Historically, the Virginia Office of the
Emergency Medical Services had difficulties obtaining the neces-
sary equipment for the implementation of Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation background checks.'42 This delay persisted through
fall 2013.143
2. Eating Disorders
In an effort to raise awareness regarding eating disorders, the
General Assembly enacted Virginia Code section 22.1-273.2,
which requires each school board to provide parents of schoolchil-
dren in grades five through twelve with educational information
on eating disorders. 144 Scholarship concerning the effect of eating
disorders on young individuals has grown in the past decade and
a half. For instance, in a 1999 study of eleven- to sixteen-year-old
African-American and Caucasian girls, researchers found signifi-
cant inverse associations between increased parental education
and various factors of harmful disorder outlooks, such as "drive
for thinness."145 In other words, the better parents were educated,
140. Act of Mar. 8, 2012, ch. 180, 2012 Va. Acts 291, 291 (currently codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-137.02 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-111.5(E) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
142. Michael Berg, Implementation of FBI Background Checks Delayed, EMS BULL. 6
(2013), https://www.vdh.virginia.gov/OEMS/EMSBulletin/Fall2013.pdf.
143. Id.
144. Act of Mar. 25, 2013, ch. 715, 2013 Va. Acts 1293, 1293 (currently codified at VA.
CODE. ANN. § 22.1-273.2 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
145. See Ruth H. Striegel-Moore et al., Eating Disorder Symptoms in a Cohort of 11 to
16- Year-Old Black and White Girls, 27 INT'L J. EATING DISORDERS 49, 56 (2000).
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the less likely it was that their daughters would drive to achieve
a waifish figure. It therefore seems reasonable to think that in-
creased parental education could improve future health outcomes
in children and young adults.
3. Zoning and Temporary Health Care Structures
While health law and zoning law do not often intersect, Virgin-
ia Code section 15.2-2292.1 provides that a married couple may
reside in a "temporary family health care structure."146 As The
Washington Post described it, a temporary family health care
structure is "an apartment equipped like a hospital room that can
be set up in your backyard.""' The newspaper calls these units
"granny pods" that "have arrived on the market as the nation
prepares for a wave of graying baby boomers to retire."1' The con-
sequence of the amendment, among others, is that the law now
permits two individuals-rather than a "person"-to live in a
temporary family health care structure when one individual is
mentally or physically impaired, "and the other requires assis-
tance with one or more activities of daily living. . . .
4. Medical Malpractice-Expert Witness Certification
In 2013, the General Assembly revised Virginia Code section
8.01-20.1 to permit a circuit court to conduct an in camera review
of the certifying expert opinion obtained by the plaintiff."o Under
the statute, "[i]f the plaintiff did not obtain a necessary certifying
expert opinion at the time the plaintiff requested service of pro-
cess on a [medical malpractice] defendant as required under this
section, the court shall impose sanctions according to the provi-
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2292.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
147. MedCottage Offers New Elder Care Option, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2012), http://
www.washingtonpost.comlposttv/medcottage-offers-new-elder-care-option/2012/11/27/dO
956030-38ab-11e2-9258-ac7c78d5c680_video.html; see also Fredrick Kunkle, Pioneering
the Granny Pod: Fairfax County Family Adapts to High-Tech Dwelling that Could Change
Elder Care, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/localldc-politics/
pioneering-the-granny-pod-fairfax-county-family-adapts-to-high-tech-dwelling-that-could-
change-elder-care/2012/11/25/4d9ccb44-lel8-11e2-ba31-3083ca97c314 story.html (describ-
ing the dwelling as "essentially a portable hospital room").
148. Kunkle, supra note 147.
149. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2292.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
150. Act of Mar. 20, 2013, ch. 610, 2013 Va. Acts 1086, 1086-87 (currently codified at
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-20.1, -50.1 (Cum. Supp. 2014), 16.1-83.1 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
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sions of section 8.01-271.1 and may dismiss the case with preju-
dice.""' Circuit courts have construed this language as enabling a
review and determination whether a particular case requires an
expert certification,152 and the General Assembly's revision of the
statute further supports this interpretation since a court can re-
view a plaintiffs expert certification in camera.
5. Medical Malpractice and Proposed Statute of Limitations
Delegate Jennifer McClellan's 2013 proposal to amend Virginia
Code section 8.01-243's statute of limitations in cases of cancer
did not pass in the General Assembly." Specifically, her amend-
ment proposed that "[i]n a claim where negligence is a proximate
cause of a failure to diagnose or a delay in the diagnosis of a ma-
lignant tumor or cancer," the two-year limitations period on per-
sonal injury would be extended one year from the date a health
care provider communicates a cancer diagnosis.' In Delegate
McClellan's own words, "[a]s drafted, the bill is too broad, and I
asked that it be tabled to spend more time getting the language
right. I will reintroduce this bill [in 2014]."
Delegate McClellan's intentions seem to be well placed when
considered alongside the Supreme Court of Virginia's ruling in
Howell v. Sobhan, where the court explained that "[i]n a medical
malpractice case, as in other types of negligence actions, the
plaintiff must prove not only that the defendant violated the ap-
plicable standard of care and was therefore negligent, but also
that the defendant's negligent acts were a proximate cause of the
injury."'5 ' On the other hand, Delegate McClellan's proposed lan-
guage-"where negligence is a proximate cause of [the breach]"-
appears to create the odd circumstance that one could be negli-
gent but not liable for an action in negligence. As the court stated
in Blue Ridge Service Corp. v. Saxon Shoes, Inc., "[t]he elements
of an action in negligence are a legal duty on the part of the de-
151. Id. This text was present before the 2013 amendment. Id.
152. See, e.g., Order of Suffolk City Circuit Court, No. 13-1020 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 30,
2014) (City of Suffolk).
153. See H.B. 1874, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2013).
154. Id.
155. Jennifer McClellan, My 2013 Legislation, HOUSE OF DELEGATES, http://www.jenn
ifermcclellan.com/page/my-2013-legislation (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
156. 278 Va. 278, 283, 682 S.E.2d 938, 941 (2009) (emphasis added).
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fendant, breach of that duty, and a showing that such breach was
the proximate cause of injury, resulting in damage to the plain-
tiff."57
6. Practitioners, Suspension or Revocation of License by Health
Regulatory Board
The General Assembly's 2013 addition of Virginia Code section
54.1-2408.3 addressed an apparent loophole in the ability of
health practitioners to continue practicing even when their li-
cense is suspended. This statute now explicitly prohibits a practi-
tioner or entity whose license is suspended or revoked by a health
regulatory board of the Virginia Department of Health Profes-
sions from practicing in Virginia, pending appeal of the particular
board's order."'
7. Emergency Medical Services and Policy Development
The General Assembly directed the Board of Health to charge
the State Emergency Medical Services Advisory Board
("SEMSAB") with developing and implementing certain policies
related to statewide emergency medical services.'" These include
notifying an emergency medical services provider of the appeals
process when he has received an adverse decision on his ability to
provide those services in the future.xco SEMSAB must also imple-
ment standard operating procedures for the purposes of develop-
ing protocols for basic life support services provided by emergency
medical personnel.16 ' Finally, the statute also attempts to make
training materials and education more homogenous by requiring
the Board of Health to review educational initiatives in coopera-
tion with the SEMSAB. 12
157. 271 Va. 206, 218, 624 S.E.2d 55, 62 (2006) (citing Trimyer v. Norfolk Tallow Co.,
192 Va. 776, 780, 66 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1951)) (emphasis added).
158. Act of Mar. 6, 2013, ch. 115, 2013 Va. Acts 178, 179 (currently codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2408.3 (Repl. Vol. 2013)).
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8. Disclosure of Information Regarding Lyme Disease
In apparent anticipation of reporting by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention that Lyme disease is infecting many
more individuals in the country than previously believed,"' the
General Assembly passed Virginia Code section 54.1-2963.2.164
This statute requires that physicians ordering Lyme disease test-
ing for patients provide written notice about the disease."' The
notice cautions against the clandestine nature of the illness in all
capital letters: "IF YOU ARE TESTED FOR LYME DISEASE,
AND THE RESULTS ARE NEGATIVE, THIS DOES NOT NEC-
ESSARILY MEAN YOU DO NOT HAVE LYME DISEASE."166 It
then encourages these patients to maintain contact with physi-
cians regarding possible symptoms and additional treatment. 167
Equally important for physicians, subsection (B) gives providers
immunity from civil liability "for the provision of the written in-
formation required by this section" unless the doctor is grossly
negligent or engages in willful misconduct.'68 For a brief moment
in fall 2012, Lyme disease (and Lyme disease litigation) was even
an issue in former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney's presi-
dential campaign.'69 Whether Governor Romney's focus on Lyme
disease in northern Virginia helped precipitate this law is un-
known, but the bill was introduced by Barbara J. Comstock (Re-
publican) of McLean,17' and the majority of patrons were sourced
163. Press Release, CDC Provides Estimate of Americans Diagnosed with Lyme Disease
Each Year, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HuM. SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2013/p0819-lyme-disease.
html.
164. Act of Mar. 12, 2013, ch. 215, 2013 Va. Acts 376, 376 (currently codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2963.2 (Repl. Vol. 2013)).
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2963.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. § 54.1-2963.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
169. See Dorothy Kupcha Leland, Touched by Lyme: Romney's Mailer Tangles Lyme
Disease with Partisan Politics, LYMEDISEASE.ORG (Oct. 1, 2012), http://lymedisease.org/
news/touchedbylyme/romney-lyme-mailer.html (cataloguing responses from various news
outlets from a Lyme-disease awareness perspective); see also Michael Specter, Mitt Rom-
ney Versus Lyme Disease and Science, NEW YORKER (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.newyorker.
com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/10/mitt-romney-versus-lyme-disease-and-science.html
("Just when it looked like Mitt Romney might ignore scientific issues this fall, he vowed, in
a flyer he sent out last week, to 'get control' of the 'massive epidemic' of chronic Lyme dis-
ease 'wreaking havoc' on the residents of northern Virginia.").
170. H.B. 1933, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2013) (enacted as Act of Mar. 12, 2013,
ch. 215, 2013 Va. Acts 376).
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from other northern Virginia locations such as Lansdowne, South
Riding, Herndon, Centreville, and Leesburg."'
9. Voluntary Electronic Monitoring in Nursing Homes
House Bill 2130, signed into law by Governor McDonnell on
March 21, 2013, required the Board of Health to issue regulations
controlling the implementation of voluntary electronic monitoring
in the rooms of residents at nursing homes. 17 2 Policies concerning
this issue have existed since at least 2004.173 Among other things,
these policies allow residents the right to refuse electronic moni-
toring. In addition, nursing home facilities must have procedures
established to obtain the documented consent of the resident pri-
or to any installation of monitoring equipment. Further, these
policies state that a nursing home
may require the resident, resident's family, or legal representative to
be responsible for all aspects of the operation of the monitoring
equipment, including the removal and replacement of tapes, and for
firewall protections to prevent images that would violate obscenity
laws from being inadvertently shown on the Internet.17 4
Notwithstanding, the integrity of firewall protections, while an
admirable goal, may be elusive in practice for a resident and his
or her family members due to the sophistication of electronic se-
curity issues in present-day society.
C. 2014 Session
1. Disposition of Dead Bodies
Virginia Code section 32.1-309.2 provides that where the next
of kin of a deceased individual fails or refuses to claim the de-
ceased person's body within ten days, the locality's attorney must
request an order authorizing the person or institution having ini-
tial custody of the body to transfer custody of the body to a funer-
171. Id.
172. Act. of Mar. 21, 2013, ch. 674, 2013 Va. Acts 1222, 1222.
173. See VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, OFF. OF LICENSURE & CERTIFICATION, ELECTRONIC
MONITORING OF RESIDENTS' RooMs 1 (2004), available at http://www.vdh.state.va.us/OLC/
Laws/documents/NursingHomes/Electronic%20Monitoring.pdf.
174. Id. at 1, 3 (emphasis added).
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al service establishment."' This statute also immunizes persons
and institutions for any claims "resulting from acceptance and
disposition" of the body in accordance with the statute, unless he
or she acts in bad faith or with malicious intent."' It remains a
Class 1 misdemeanor for anyone to dispose of a dead body on pri-
vate property without permission of the landowner or on public
property. 77
2. Payment for Medical Services
Virginia Code section 65.2-605 modifies the obligations em-
ployers have to employees for payment of medical expenses under
the current workers' compensation scheme.'7 ' The statute now
limits employers to pecuniary liability of no more than twenty
percent of reimbursement for nurse practitioners or physician as-
sistants serving as assistants-at-surgery during a medical proce-
dure on an eligible injured employee."'7 This statute also limits to
fifty percent the amount an employer must pay to an assistant
surgeon in the same specialty as a primary surgeon during an el-
* * p180igible employee's surgery.
3. Surgical Technologists and Assistants
For three years, Senator George L. Barker attempted to pass a
bill concerning when individuals could use the title "registered
surgical technologist" or "registered surgical assistant.""' He
eventually succeeded in 2014.182 The law provides that a person
cannot use the above titles unless registered with the Board of
Medicine.'"' In turn, the Board must register those health profes-
sionals who have credentials from the National Board of Surgical
175. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-309.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
176. Id. § 32.1-309.2(G) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
177. Id. § 18.2-323.01 (Repl. Vol. 2014).
178. Id. § 65.2-605 (Supp. 2014).
179. Id. § 65.2-605(B)(1) (Supp. 2014).
180. Id. § 65.2-605(B)(2) (Supp. 2014).
181. See S.B. 328, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2014) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2014,
ch. 531, 2014 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2956.12 to -2956.13 (Supp.
2014))); S.B. 313, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2013).
182. See Ch. 531, 2014 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2956.12,
-2956.13 (Supp. 2014)).
183. VA. CODE ANN. H§ 54.1-2956.12(A), 54.1-2956.13(A) (Supp. 2014).
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Technology and Surgical Assisting, have successfully completed a
technologist or assistant (respectively) training program as part
of that person's service with the armed forces of the United
States, or have practiced as a technologist or assistant at any
time in the six months prior to July 1, 2014, provided that indi-
vidual registers with the Board by July 1, 2015.184
4. Active Duty Military Health Care Providers
On the topic of the armed forces, the General Assembly amend-
ed Virginia Code section 54.1-2901 to clarify that active duty mili-
tary health care providers offering health services at a public or
private health care facility under official military orders are ex-
empt from the state's licensure requirements."'
5. Civil Immunity for Certain Health Care Providers
In the 2014 session, the General Assembly extended protection
from civil liability to members of and consultants to two types of
health-related boards and committees."' The first is one estab-
lished under a national accrediting organization granted authori-
ty by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to assure
compliance with Medicare, and the second is one approved by
state or local associations representing licensed health care pro-
viders."' Importantly, civil immunity extends only to acts or
omissions performed as part of a member or consultant's duties
on these committees. 88
6. Expert Witness Testimony from Physician Assistant
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01-
401.2 to allow a physician assistant to testify as an expert wit-
ness "as to etiology, diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, treatment
184. Id. §§ 54.1-2956.12(B), -2956.13(B) (Supp. 2014).
185. Act of Feb. 20, 2014, ch. 8, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN § 54.1-2901 (Supp. 2014)).
186. Act of Feb. 27, 2014, ch. 17, 2014 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.16 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.16 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
188. Id.
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plan, and disability" of a patient in a medical malpractice case.'8 9
The amendment also provides that physician assistants cannot
testify as experts against physicians in medical malpractice ac-
tions with respect to standard of care and causation issues.'
7. Physician Assistants as Health Care Providers
If physician assistants can serve as expert witnesses on mat-
ters of diagnosis and treatment of a patient, then they should also
be defined as "health care providers" for purposes of medical mal-
practice. Effective July 1, 2014, Delegate John M. O'Bannon, III's
legislation does just that.'9' As amended in section 8.01-581.1,
physician assistants are now formally subject to medical malprac-
tice laws in the Commonwealth of Virginia.'92
8. Testimony by Health Care Provider from Outside the
Commonwealth
The General Assembly passed legislation allowing plaintiffs in
a personal injury suit in general district court to offer evidence of
their injury, treatment, and cost through reports created by out-
of-state health care providers.'" This legislation affords plaintiffs
greater evidentiary latitude, to be sure, but they must still proffer
information from the health care provider-whether out-of-state
or in-state-that he or she was treated by the health care provid-
er and that the information and costs in the report are accurate. 4
189. Act of Mar. 31, 2014, ch. 391, 2014 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.2 (Cum. Supp. 2014)) (emphasis removed).
190. Id.
191. Act of Mar. 3, 2014, ch. 89, 2014 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Cum. Supp. 2014)); H.B. 1134, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess.
2014).
192. Notably, this did not stop the plaintiffs from alleging negligence against these
providers for their care and treatment in the past. See, e.g., Moolchandani v. Sentara
Hosp., 68 Va. Cir. 293, 294 (2005) (Norfolk City).
193. Act of Feb. 27, 2014, ch. 25, 2014 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.




9. Discovery of Metadata
Legislation introduced, but tabled, by Delegate Albo during the
General Assembly's 2014 session offers an interesting corollary to
the Temple case, discussed previously.9 5 House Bill 490 would
have required health care providers to produce to a patient
"metadata" of the patient's electronic medical record when re-
quested by the patient's attorney.19 The bill attempted to wrangle
a clear definition for "metadata," although in describing metadata
as "data about data" it implicitly conceded the imprecision of the
targeted information.' The amendment to Virginia Code section
8.01-413 would include as metadata audit trails, "order and re-
sults detail sheets showing further details on individual audit
trail line items," and "other data that certifies how, when, where,
and by whom" electronic information has been created, viewed,
edited, or accessed."' A future iteration of this bill likely awaits
the General Assembly's consideration in 2015 should the Su-
preme Court of Virginia either decline to address the metadata
issue in Temple, or rule contrary to Delegate Albo's current defi-
nition.
10. Statute of Limitations for Falsifying Patient Records
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 19.2-8 to
increase the statute of limitations for prosecuting the misde-
meanor offense of falsifying patient records with the intent to de-
fraud from one year to three years.'99 The amendment specifically
states that actions "shall be commenced within three years of the
commission of the offense," rather than the date from which the
fraud is discovered.200 Before the amendment, prosecution for rec-
ord falsification had to occur "within one year next after there
was cause therefor," which does not appear to specify an excep-
tion for misdemeanors having a fraudulent element.20 So, was the
195. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
196. H.B. 490, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2014).
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. Act of Mar. 5, 2014, ch. 169, 2014 Va. Acts -, (codified as amended at VA.
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change in the law prompted by prosecutors missing the statute of
limitations as a result of record falsification discovered after a
year? Unfortunately, a Lexis search at the time of this publishing
revealed no recent cases citing section 18.2-260.1-the law crimi-
nalizing falsification of patient records.202
11. Tolling of Statute of Limitations after Nonsuit
In the same vein as Virginia Code section 19.2-8, the General
Assembly amended section 8.01-380 to provide that a plaintiff
may recommence his or her action within six months after suffer-
ing a voluntary nonsuit.2 0 s This legislation is not so much a
change in the current law as it is a convenient cross-reference for
litigants seeking to determine the effect of a nonsuit on the stat-
ute of limitations when reading section 8.01-380. Previously, the
law did not explicitly direct parties to section 8.01-229, the provi-
sion controlling application of the statute of limitations after a
nonsuit.204 Now, it does.
12. Minor Prohibitions: E-Cigarettes, Dextromethorphan
According to Bloomberg Industries, sales of electronic ciga-
rettes (or "e-cigarettes") could approach $1.5 billion in the United
States this year.20 ' E-cigarettes heat liquid nicotine into a vapor,
allowing for a user to inhale and disperse a cloud resembling cig-
arette smoke. 206 In May 2014, an anti-tobacco organization's study
concluded that much of the $39 million in advertising spent by e-
cigarette makers targeted potential youth customers.20 7 Respond-
ing to this and other concerns from commentators, the General
Assembly passed legislation prohibiting the sale of e-cigarettes to
202. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-260.1 (Repl. Vol. 2014).
203. Act of Mar. 3, 2014, ch. 86, 2014 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-380 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
204. Id.
205. Megan McArdle, E-Cigarettes: A $1.5 Billion Industry Braces for FDA Regulation,
BUS. WK. (Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.businessweek.comlarticles/2014-02-06/e-
cigarettes-fda-regulation-looms-for-1-dot-5-billion-industry.
206. Lowell Dale, What Are Electronic Cigarettes? Are They Safer Than Conventional
Cigarettes?, MAYO CLiNIc (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-living/quit-
smoking/expert-answers/electronic-cigarettes/faq-20057776.
207. Maggie Fox, E-Cigarette Makers Going After Youth, Report Finds, NBC NEWS




minors and their possession thereof.208
Concern over the health of minors is not limited to e-cigarettes,
of course. The General Assembly also enacted Virginia Code sec-
tions 18.2-265.19 to 18.2-265.21, which prohibit the sale of dex-
tromethorphan--or Robitussin and other similar cough suppres-
sant products-to those under eighteen years old.209 At $25, the
civil penalty for violating the law is a relative slap on the wrist
for pharmacies, employees, and minors drawing an allowance.210
However, these two pieces of health-related legislation demon-
strate the relative agility of the General Assembly to address
emerging health issues that concern individuals other than the
voting eligible population (and, for all but a handful of lawmakers
who voted against the bills, afford those running for reelection
with strong "protect the children" credentials).
CONCLUSION
With the Affordable Care Act remaining divisive and a recent
legislative battle over potential Medicaid expansion, health care
law remains at the forefront of our national and state-wide politi-
cal debate. Going forward we can expect to see an active court
addressing procedural and evidentiary issues in medical negli-
gence litigation, and an active General Assembly making incre-
mental changes in this complex area of law.
208. See Act of Mar. 27, 2014, ch. 357, 2014 Va. Acts , (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.2 (Repl. Vol. 2014)).
209. Act of Mar. 3, 2014, ch. 101, 2014 Va. Acts , - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
18.2-265.19 to -265.21 (Repl. Vol. 2014)).
210. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-265.20(D) (Repl. Vol. 2014).
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